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PART I: RIGHTS AND WORK
THE RIGHT TO WORK: LAW AND IDEOLOGY
RICHARD T. DE GEORGE*
Many people in the United States feel strongly about human
rights. They champion human rights, criticize the violation of human
rights abroad, and both support the U.S. Government's complaints
about human rights violations in other countries and encourage a
stronger policy on human rights than the Reagan administration has
adopted. Yet listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
the right to work-a right neither recognized nor respected in the
United States, where unemployment is both accepted and expected.
How are we to explain this apparent contradiction in attitudes, and
what importance does it have for law?
I. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WORK
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23, states:
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employ-
ment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to pro-
tection against unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence
worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by
other means of social protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions
for the protection of his interests.'
The right, as stated, requires both interpretation and defense.
As every human right it applies to all human beings simply by virtue
of their being human. The right is appropriately implemented different-
ly both in different societies and for people of different ages and cir-
cumstances. Infants as well as all other human beings have the right
* Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas.
1. I. BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (2d ed. 1981).
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to work; but being physically and mentally incapable of working, they
do not actively exercise the right. Adults in primitive societies exer-
cise the right differently from those in advanced industrial societies.
We can roughly divide the population of the United States into
four groups. One group is composed of children too young to work,
or at least considered too young to work full time in our society. Either
they are incapable of working because they are infants or very young
children, or they are required to go to school and so are legally
precluded from working full time. After a certain age they may be
allowed to work part time. A second group consists of retired workers.
They have worked for a certain period of time and have now left
the work force. A third group consists of those unable to work-
whether because of sickness, injury or other infirmity. The fourth and
largest group consists of adults able to work. We shall be primarily
concerned with this fourth group in an initial approach to the right
to work.2
The group of able bodied adults can be further subdivided. The
largest subgroup consists of those actually in the work force, either
self-employed, employed by government, by someone else or by some
firm. The second largest subgroup consists of those who work at home
but who are not employed. Here are included housewives and mothers
with no outside employment, who do not seek employment. There is
clearly a difference between work and employment. A woman who
raises a family, and "keeps house" works but is not employed. A per-
son who sculpts, writes, or makes his or her living in some similar
way works but is not employed. Children who work at home or for
the family may also not be employed, yet still work. The husband
and wife of a small farm family work in the fields, care for the animals,
and work in the house; the children do chores in the morning and
evening, and go to school between times. All the members of the fami-
ly work. None is employed, but none is unemployed either.
The third largest group are the unemployed. This group can be
further subdivided. It includes young adults who want to work but
are unable to find their first full-time job, as well as those who work
at home but want outside employment. It includes seasonal workers,
young or old, who work in certain seasons and are unable to find work
2. This is not to deny that there are serious problems of interpretation of
the right to work that concern the other three groups, e.g.: at what age do children
become adults and deserve full protection of the right to work; does forced retire-
ment violate the right to work; and do the physically and mentally impaired who desire
to work have the same right to appropriate work as others?
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in other seasons. It includes the hard core unemployed, who do not
have work and who have given up looking for a job. It includes the
structurally unemployed, i.e., those who had work in a certain industry
but who are unable to find that sort of employment, are unable to
relocate, and have no other skills to sell. It includes as well the cyclical-
ly unemployed, i.e., those who are unemployed because of a cut-back
in the number of workers employed by firms due to recessions or
depressions; and the frictionally unemployed, i.e., those who are tem-
porarily out of work for a short period while changing jobs.
Employment usually implies both an employer and a wage. Work
implies neither of these. Defining work is notoriously difficult.' We
can, however, determine what the right to work involves without
deciding precisely what is and is not work and how we distinguish
work from play or from other kinds of human activity.
The right to work as a universal, human right, is a derived right.
It can be derived from the right to life, the right to development,
and/or the right to respect. In each case the derivation hinges on cer-
tain assumptions and background conditions. Thus the right to work
can be derived from the right to life to the extent that access to work
is necessary to obtain the wherewithal to preserve life. The right to
life carries with it the right to engage in those activities, compatible
with the exercise of the rights of others, necessary to sustain life.
Work is the typical means by which adults maintain themselves and
produce the goods they need and want to sustain themselves and those
dependent on them; to that extent the right to work is a derivative
of the right to life. The right so derived is a negative, not a positive
right; and the assumption is that if one is deprived of work, one is
deprived of the means of sustaining one's life and the lives of one's
dependents. If to prevent people from working is to threaten their
lives, then in that society the right to work is easily derived from
the right to life.
While the assumption that people in general produce the means
of their subsistence is correct, it is not necessarily the case that each
adult person able to engage in productive labor must be allowed to
do so to prevent him from dying. For society can so arrange what
it produces to sustain not only those who work and those dependent
on them, but others as well. In the United States, for instance, a
variety of welfare programs are justified on the basis of a recognized
3. See Burke, 'Work' and 'Play, 82 ETHICS 3347 (1971); and Sparshott, Work-
The Concept: Past, Present, and Future, 7 J. AESTHETIC EDuc. 22-38 (1973).
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right to life, which can be sustained without recognizing a right to
work.
The derivation of the right to work from the right to develop-
ment, despite a certain plausibility and appropriateness in some
societies, is tenuous for a number of reasons. If work or productive
activity is a means by which human beings develop themselves
physically and mentally, then to the extent that one has a right to
such development, and to the extent that work is necessary to such
development, one has the right to work. At both critical junctures
the link is weak. For even granting the right to development, such
a right could be implemented by education, leisure activity, and other
non-work related means. Furthermore, it is not clear that work of
many kinds does in fact develop one either physically or mentally.
A charge frequently heard to the contrary is that much work is
stultifying and prevents rather than fosters development.
The derivation that hinges on the right of all human beings to
respect provides the most solid basis for the right to work. To be
a human being is a matter not only of being of a certain biological
type but also of belonging to human society. A full, able-bodied, com-
petent member of society has a role and plays a role in it. Each has
a right to do so. No adult is "excess" or "expendable" and the recogni-
tion of this fact is part and parcel of what it means for people to
have the right to respect. Work is the typical way by which human
adults assert their independence and are able to assume their full
share of responsibility in a community. Work involves the assump-
tion of one's place in the community, whether it is work in the home,
the fields, the factory, or the office. One's self respect as well as the
respect of others is closely linked with what one does, how a person
expresses himself through his actions, and the extent to which one
assumes the full burden of and responsibility for one's life and one's
part in the social whole. A person who is not allowed to work, is not
allowed to take a rightful place in society as a contributing, mature,
responsible adult. The fight to work is in this way closely related
to the right to respect and derived from it for every society. It is
for this reason that in many societies to deprive a person of a pro-
ductive role in society is a form of ostracism, tantamount to punish-
ment, and justifiable only for a serious social offense or crime.
The right to work can be interpreted as both a negative and
as a positive right. As a negative right, no one, including the govern-
ment, may legitimately prohibit someone who wishes to work from
doing so, within the normal restrictions for negative rights, such as
not infringing the similar, equal, or more important rights of others.
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As a positive right it requires at least that one's society provide one
with the opportunity for full membership including the opportunity
for participation in the productive activity of that society.
The relation of respect and the right to work is implied in Article
23 of the Declaration of Human Rights, which insists on the "free
choice of employment" to preclude forced labour, slavery, or gross
exploitation, and on "just and favorable remuneration ensuring for
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity."
As with most rights, the right to work rises to consciousness
only at a certain historical time. In the idyllic society of an imaginary
tropical island where needs are few, food is plentiful, and the popula-
tion is small in comparison with the land and resources available, the
right to work would not arise. It is not explicitly raised although it
is implicitly implemented in a traditional society, for in such a society
everyone has a place in the social order-whether that society is one
of hunting, herding, or agriculture and whether it is organized on
tribal, feudal, or other similar lines. Each adult is accepted into the
community and participates in the activity of the adults of that com-
munity. Nor would one tend to invoke the right in a country where
land is plentiful and where there are many alternative ways to keep
oneself and one's family flourishing with dignity. The right to work
was not an issue when there was always an alternative to the jobs
available. Finally, the right to work would tend not to arise in a society
that had a chronic shortage of labor. If the demand for labor always
exceeded the supply, the notion of the right to work would have little,
if any, importance, except in its negative sense.
The issue of the right to work typically arises when the supply
of labour exceeds the demand, when large numbers of people have
no choice but to work for others, and when the social fabric
characteristic of tribes and extended families who share whatever
is available breaks down. Historically, the right to work becomes an
issue with industrialization, because only a few own the means of pro-
duction and the typical person earns his living by working for a wage.
In an industrialized society the line between the negative and
the positive interpretation of the right to work often blurs. Prevent-
ing someone from working in a traditional society involves depriving
that person of access to work or to a place in the society. In an
industrial society those who depend on employment for wages can
be kept from working by being deprived of employment. This can
be done actively by intervention or some action such as blackballing,
or passively when an employer needs workers. Unemployment might
in this latter sense result from the economic structure of society. It
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is not the active result of employers discriminating or out of malice
refusing to employ people. No individual employer has the obligation
to employ others, and employers, acting individually in their own
interests, cannot be blamed if collectively they cannot provide work
for all who want it. It is the way the economic system operates that
is to blame, not individual employers within it.
In such a situation the right to work is equivalent to the right
to employment for those able, willing, and desiring work and unable
to engage in productive work if not employed. Properly speaking, the
right to employment is not itself a human right but becomes a
specification appropriate in industrialized society of the human right
to work. The right to employment is properly exercised by the
unemployed against the society with such a system, since it is the
system that is responsible for preventing them from working.
Americans have come to accept the system because of the goods and
wealth it produces, and have provided welfare as an alternative to
employment. But welfare has masked the right to work and has kept
its violation from general consciousness. For although welfare does
indeed preserve life, it does not allow the able-to-work who receive
it to take an active, productive part in their society with the con-
comitant respect and self-respect that goes with having such a posi-
tion in work or employment.
The notion of full employment is often treated as equitable for
practical purposes with the right to work. Thus, the Declaration Con-
cerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour Organiza-
tion, 1944, emphasizes not the right to work but:
the obligation of the International Labour Organization to
further among the nations of the world programmes which
will achieve: (a) full employment and the raising of stan-
dards of living; (b) the employment of workers in the
occupations in which they can have the satisfaction of giv-
ing the fullest measure of their skill and attainments and
make their greatest contribution to the common well-
being. . ..
The European Social Charter, 1961, which was "to be complemen-
tary to the European Convention on Human Rights" 5 and was signed
by the members of the Council of Europe, also closely links the right
to work with full employment. Accordingly, under Article 1 of The
Right to Work, we find:
4. BROWNLIE., supra note 1, at 174.
5. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 301.
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With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right
to work, the Contracting Parties undertake: (1) to accept
as one of their primary aims a level of employment as
possible, with a view to the attainment of full employment;
(2) to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn
his living in an occupation freely entered upon; (3) to
establish or maintain free employment services for all
workers; (4) to provide or promote appropriate vocational
guidance, training and rehabilitation.'
The right to employment, however, is not identical with full
employment. Full employment is an aim or goal that if reached would
go a long way towards implementing the right to employment for all
those seeking it. However "full employment" is usually defined in such
a way in the United States as to be compatible with a certain level
of unemployment. Some have even suggested that ten percent
unemployment in the U.S. might constitute full employment.' Since
the percentage is based on unemployment figures, it ignores the
"discouraged" or "hard-core" unemployed, who have given up looking
for work. Full employment, moreover, is a societal goal, not a right.
It is a goal properly adopted by a society in which unemployment
is a result of the socio-economic system. There is an important dif-
ference between full employment as a goal and the right to work,
or its instantiation as the right to employment. As a societal goal,
full employment is appropriately balanced against other societal goals,
such as control of inflation. The right of individuals, however, is dif-
ferent from societal goals and should not be weighed simply as one
good against another. The point of a right is that it is an entitlement
that should be respected even at the cost of some other good. There
is no right to single-digit inflation, even though that is desirable. One
can attempt both to implement rights and control inflation; but the
difference between considering full employment simply as one goal
among many and seeing the right to work as a valid individual claim
against society is fundamental.
II. IDEOLOGY AND LABOUR LEGISLATION
How are we to understand the failure of the United States to
recognize the right to work? It becomes intelligible when we under-
stand the ideology behind U.S. labour legislation. The ideology has
two main aspects. The first is linked historically with the conception
6. Id. at 303.
7. See Neikirk, Unfortunately, We May Now Be Close To "Full Employment,"
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 1, 1983, §5, at 3.
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of free enterprise that has grown up in the United States and can
be understood in terms of both social conditions and ideas. The second
is related to how labour legislation develops in the United States and
is linked to the adversarial relation of labour and management and
the power conflict that results from this. Ideology helps prevent
recognition of the right to work; but the portion of the ideology in
question is a carry-over from an earlier age, no longer reflects reality,
and should properly be replaced.
The aspects of the free enterprise ideology that prevents recogni-
tion of the right to work in the United States has its roots in the
nation's history. At the time the Constitution was adopted the coun-
try was young and growing. The Bill of Rights did not include the
right to work, for that right had not emerged as a matter of concern,
either in its negative or in its positive sense, except in the case of
slavery. Slavery was a different and separate issue. The right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were paramount, although behind
the scenes the right to property was strongly upheld. The main fear
was of government intrusion, and the rights to be secured were
primarily against the government. The right to life was not interpreted
as the right to work. A number of factors make this intelligible and
make it acceptable.
The availability of the frontier was both a safety valve and an
opportunity for people who wished to strike out on their own. The
population was relatively small, and the opportunities many. It was
not true, as would later be the case, that the only way for most peo-
ple to live was to sell their labour to entrepreneurs for wages.
Together with the land and opportunities available went three other
ideological components, the roots of which can be traced to the condi-
tions of the times.
The first of these was the doctrine of self-reliance. It was a trait
that was cherished, and had to be cherished if one were to survive
in a new land, especially on its frontiers. Self-reliance, of course, did
not preclude helping one's neighbour. Yet each person was expected
to stand on his own feet, work, and fend for himself.
Joined to this was the doctrine of competitive individualism. The
ideology of incipient capitalism, which developed in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, incorporated the notion of competition. In
the competitive battle each person was ego-centered. The best suc-
ceeded. The experience of the immigrants to a new land, joined with
the experience of the frontier, complemented the capitalistic emphasis
on the individual and the concomitant notion of competition.
Individualism was ideologically joined with competition to become
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 [1984], Art. 2
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"rugged individualism," according to which one competed and managed
on one's own, whatever the outcome.
The third component comes from the "Protestant work ethic."
This complemented the other two components and fostered the
developing capitalist ideology. Industriousness was a virtue. Each per-
son was expected to do his fair share. The belief was that those who
worked hard prospered. Prosperity was an indication of the virtue
of industry. The lazy reaped their own reward in the way of poverty
and difficulty. Each person, it was believed, had the opportunity to
succeed, and success depended on individual initiative.
This ideology had its basis in reality. There was, of course,
unemployment. But the general belief was that opportunities were
available for the industrious, those willing to take a chance, seek their
own fortune, and if necessary tame the wilderness. The right to work
did not emerge as an issue. It became an issue only when the labour
supply exceeded demand; and only with the development of large
industry, which carried with it the growth of a working force depen-
dent on others for jobs. But the frontier had disappeared; there are
no longer abundant opportunities for the self-reliant; and although
industriousness is still deserving of reward, the equation of poverty
with laziness is clearly not justified.
Traditionally, the individualistic ideology of self-reliance has been
fiercely opposed to government's competing with private enterprise.
The belief is that government is not in the business of business.
Government ownership of the means of production is anathema, and
government should not compete with the private sector. There are
a few exceptions in the service sector, e.g., where state supported
hospitals and universities compete with private institutions. But these
are usually non-profit areas and areas in which the rights of the popula-
tion are not adequately served by the private sector.
The general opposition to government's ownership of industry,
of government's competition with industry, manifests itself in three
ways with respect to the right to work. The first and most signifi-
cant is the opposition to the notion of a human right to work because
that right is viewed as socialistic and is identified with countries run
by communist governments. Historically defenders of socialism have
indeed the right to work and the constitutions of a number of socialist
states recognize this in various ways.' In the Soviet Union the right
goes together with a concurrent obligation on the part of all able
8. See I. DUCHACEK, RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE WORLD TODAY: CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROMISE & REALITY 15 (1973Y and Becker, The Obligation to Work, 91 ETHICS 36
(1980).
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bodied Soviet citizens to work. Hence not working is not an allowable
alternative, and those who do not work are guilty of parasitism-a
criminal offense. Since the Soviet government, moreover, is the only
employer insofar as all enterprises are government owned, the govern-
ment is in a position to allocate jobs, to train people for jobs into
which they are put, to transfer people from one job to another, and
in other ways to secure full employment-at least nominally.
The joining of the right to work with the obligation to work is
one of the major reasons for rejecting the right as a bona fide right.
Such a purported right to work is most easily implemented in a society
in which the government owns the means of production, in which
private ownership is not permitted, and in which everyone is in fact
an employee of the state. In such a society, the state clearly should
not discriminate by giving work to some and not to others. Since it
controls all the means of survival, it has the obligation of making sure
that everyone has work who must work in order to live. It thus
has the obligation of providing work for all those capable of doing
so. This obligation is further fulfilled in a way that is counter to the
free enterprise system. Since the government controls all the jobs,
it can allocate them. It can plan how many engineers, machine workers,
teachers, or doctors to train, and it can correlate jobs to skills, and
anticipate openings for those who will be coming on the job market.
It can move people or force transfers if need be, as well as provide
retraining and whatever else is necessary to match the labour available
to the work to be done. This almost total control makes the implemen-
tation of the right to work relatively easy. In the process a great
deal that is cherished in the free enterprise system is lost.
Since the models in contemporary times for implementing the
right to work have come from communist societies, and since the
implications of implementing the right in that way are unpalatable
to most Americans, their rejection of that version of the right to work
is understandable. Their mistake, however, is to identify the right
to work with the form it takes in socialist or communist countries.
For the right to work is compatible with free enterprise and private
ownership of industry. It is compatible with what many in American
society recognize as the right not to work if one chooses and is able
to do so without calling upon state funds for support9 as well as with
the emphasis Americans also want to place on the section of the state-
ment from the Declaration of Human Rights following the first clause,
namely the right to free choice of employment.
9. Contra., see Becker, supra note 6 (in which he claims a duty to work, but
not one that should be enforced by law).
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Second, the free enterprise system allows people to take risks
and to fail as well as to succeed. It also allows the market to make
adjustments in prices, wages, the allocation of resources, and the
allocation of labour. This is a cornerstone of the ideology and of the
system. To have government intervene in this process at any point
supposedly undermines the system. Guaranteed full employment, the
ideology maintains, interferes with these processes in such a way as
to preclude their efficient operation. The adoption of a policy that
guarantees full employment, it is feared, is an invitation to govern-
ment to set wages, to prevent the natural dislocations and redistribu-
tion of labour, and to interfere with the free enterprise process. If
these were the inevitable results, then implementation of the right
to work would indeed be incompatible with the ideals of the free enter-
prise system. However, the belief that these are the inevitable results
is neither well founded nor empirically demonstrable. Government
already plays an enormous role in the U.S. economy. Just as govern-
ment regulation does not necessarily lead to socialism, neither does
recognition and implementation of the right to work. The right is in
fact recognized in many non-socialist countries.
The third factor militating against recognition of the right to
work is the fear of the government's becoming an employer of last
resort. Unless people were put to work on meaningless jobs, govern-
ment would supposedly compete directly with the private sector.
Moreover, there is great skepticism about the success of any job plan
adopted by the government. For, it is argued, given the existing
bureaucratic machinery of government, it costs much more for the
government to implement any such job program than it is worth. 0
Neither the fear nor skepticism need militate against recogniz-
ing the right to work. Government as employer of last resort can be
interpreted in many ways. Government need not compete with private
industry; it can cooperate in supplying and supplementing employ-
ment and training opportunities in the private sector itself. Nor need
every government-funded program be cost-inefficient. The free enter-
prise system has built-in corrective mechanisms for high unemploy-
ment. But the mechanisms operate at great cost to individuals who
are at the mercy of the system, and whose right to work is violated.
The government's acting as employer of last resort does not
necessarily lead to socialism; but even without acting as employer
of last resort, the government can recognize and implement the right
to work, and such recognition should not be precluded by ill-founded
ideological beliefs.
10. See, e.g., Bartlett, Public Works Programs Don't Create Jobs, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, November 30, 1982, at 28.
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If ideology stands in the way of recognizing the right to work,
the history of the development of labour legislation, resulting from
this ideology, hinders its implementation. As other papers in this
volume note, labour legislation in the United States has developed
largely out of the relations between management and labor, especially
in the collective bargaining process. As a consequence, unless an issue
is in the interest of either labour (as represented by the unions) or
management such that it arises in collective bargaining, it usually fails
for lack of an advocate. If, moreover, an issue is opposed by either
labour or management outside the collective bargaining situation and
without the full support of the other side, it has formidable opposi-
tion to overcome and slight chance of either getting a full hearing
or of finding its way into legislation. The issue of the right to work
is such an issue. It is opposed to the interest of management, does
not arise in collective bargaining, and is given less importance by
unions than issues that more directly affect their members.
The right to work, even if understood as full employment, is
clearly not in the interest of management. Unemployment guarantees
the availability of people for at least some-usually lower level-jobs.
It helps keep wages down and helps enforce labour discipline, since
fear of loss of one's job is a real threat. Given a choice, it is in manage-
ment's interest to have a pool of unemployed from which to choose.
Management would, therefore, not be anxious to have legislation that
would guarantee full employment or recognize a right to work. If,
however, full employment included people in training programs and
people who were employed by the government only as an employer
of last resort, there would in fact be a pool of people from which
to draw when the need presented itself in times of expansion; and
the presence of training programs might also guarantee a larger pool
of qualified people than would otherwise be the case.
Any attempt to get a full hearing for the right to work must
overcome a semantic hurdle. To the extent that the right to work
has received any attention in labour law in the United States it has
been in the sense of a negative right. Thus, for instance, it has been
argued that union shops (in which union membership is required for
employment either on or after the thirtieth day of beginning
employment)" prevent those who do not want to join the union from
working, or at least from working where they choose. Legislation on
the union shop has varied from state to state in the United States,
ever since Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley law allowed states to
11. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) of 1947, S 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
S 158(a)(3) (1982).
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outlaw such shops.'" But although the legislation and debates sur-
rounding union shops have been couched in terms of "right to work"
laws, they touch only a small portion of what the human right to work
covers. Whether such laws are truly for the benefit of the worker
is a hotly debated issue. Yet, ironically, at least with respect to the
right as so understood, unions oppose right to work laws. Unions
oppose such laws both because they undercut the leverage of the union
in negotiations and because they invite free riders who do not pay
union dues, yet reap the advantages secured by union bargaining.
Management typically supports such right to work laws, ostensibly
because they protect the freedom of both the worker and the manager
to enter into the bargaining process without the union. Management's
interest, however, is protected by being able to bargain individually
with workers, and it is precisely to gain the strength of numbers that
unions were formed. The existing "right to work" laws, therefore, do
not implement the human right to work we have been considering.
Having preempted the terminology, they make discussion of right to
work laws-in the sense of positively implementing the right-
confusing and difficult.
In general, organized labour supports full employment legisla-
tion. But for some of the reasons we have seen, United States unions
have not been as vocal as one would expect in support of the right
to work specifically as a human right. In practice individual unions
have often been more concerned with benefits for their members than
with the rights of unemployed workers. Some have even fought for
benefits resulting in the laying off of some of their own members. 3
Moreover, although full employment with no unemployed would put
unions in a better bargaining position than otherwise, guaranteed full
employment would also undercut to some extent the need for the pro-
tection of jobs by unions.
A good deal of labour legislation has to do with the relation of
labour and management, the rights of organized labour, and the
workers represented by the unions. Many of the unemployed are non-
union, unorganized, and unrepresented. Clearly the hard-core
unemployed are of less concern to the unions than are union members,
and in collective bargaining neither the unions nor management are
concerned with the rights of the unemployed. While the history of
labour legislation has been generated by collective bargaining and by
12. For a discussion of this, see P. SULTAN, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A STUDY IN
CONFLICT 55-62 (1958).
13. The U.A.W., for instance, in 1982 insisted on higher wages for auto
workers-twice the average for manufacturing workers-even as layoffs by auto
manufacturers mounted.
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the interests of the union on the one hand and management on the
other, less than 30 percent of the American labour force belongs to
a union, and the number of unionized workers has been diminishing
for several years.
The history of labour legislation in the United States shows that
negotiations between unions and management have not led to any
serious consideration of the human right to work. Discussion of this
right has not surfaced because in the context of collective bargaining
this right is in the interest of neither organized labour nor manage-
ment. While this fact makes the failure to notice this right understand-
able, it does not justify the absence of any legislation implementing
the right of all to work and of those who desire it and are qualified.
Consequently, the ideology underlying labour legislation should be
brought out in the open and reevaluated. Similarly, the presupposi-
tions of much of labour law jurisprudence that picture legislation as
a means of arbitrating between contending factions -organized labour
and management- should also be reexamined. This view is reinforced
by the respective ideologies of both labour and management, who see
themselves as opponents in an adversarial system. This opposition
is fostered by collective bargaining. But since the right to work can
sometimes be best implemented by collaboration rather than
antagonism between management and labour, the ideology helps sup-
press implementation of the right to work.
The reexamination shows that the traditional ideology is partially
defective. It is presupposed that organized labour and management
are the only two contending parties. Since those who are outside of
the organized labour force have no organized representative, their
rights are systematically ignored and violated. The right to work is
compatible with the best in the United States' tradition of free enter-
prise and of peaceful and productive labour relations. Implementation
of that right leads necessarily neither to socialism nor to disruption
of the worker-management relation of free enterprise. As David Beatty
in another article in this volume argues, the right to employment at
a decent wage is or should be part of the liberal ideology that has
developed in the United States. The remnants of the older ideology
have in part delayed recognition of the human right to work.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO WORK
In 1946, the Employment Act set a national goal of providing
"useful employment opportunities" for all persons "able, willing, and
seeking to work."" In 1948, the American Declaration of the Rights
14. Employment Act of 1946, Pub.L. No. 79-304, 60 Stat. 23.
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and Duties of Man in Article XIV stated: "Every person has the right
to work, under proper conditions, and to follow his vocation freely,
in so far as existing conditions of employment permit."1" But the 1946
Act established no machinery for providing such opportunities, the
Declaration was not intended to be binding, and the final clause left
much room for interpretation.
On January 3, 1976, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 went into force. This Covenant
supersedes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and has the
legal force of a treaty for its signatories. The right to work is stated
in Article 7: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favorable condi-
tions of work.... .""1 The United States signed the Covenant on October
5, 1977, but never ratified it. 8
In the United States the failure to recognize and address the
right to work has to some extent been mitigated by a variety of public
programs from unemployment insurance to welfare programs. But
while these have kept the unemployed from starving, the failure to
recognize and respect the right to work remains an anomaly in a coun-
try that places so much emphasis on human rights.
Unemployment insurance, as the name implies, is a type of
insurance program. It is available only to those who have such
insurance, and the minimal requirement is that one have been
previously employed. It is thus not available to those leaving school
who have not been previously employed on a full time basis. Nor is
it available to women, for example, who have been working in the
home raising a family and wish at a certain time to join the work
force. And it is not available to those who have been out of work
for a longer period than that covered by unemployment insurance.
As a stopgap measure for those temporarily unemployed or for those
between jobs, it is on the whole adequate and serves an obvious need.
For the others, however, it does nothing.
Welfare programs come to the rescue for some of those not
eligible for unemployment insurance and in need of help. Such pro-
grams serve another obvious need. But there is a difference between
providing support for those who cannot work outside the home because
of disability, or the need to care for children, and providing support
15. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 384.
16. BROWNLIE, supra note 1, at 118.
17. Id. at 120.
18. United Nations. MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE
SECRATARY-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITORY FUNCTIONS 99-105 (1978).
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for those who both can work and wish to do so. For the latter, the
absence of work can be and very often is demoralizing and leads to
loss of both self-respect and the respect of others. They are not respon-
sible for their unemployment, but in some sense the society or the
economic system is. That failure is only partially corrected by chari-
ty or by welfare payments. And what is not corrected marks the dif-
ference between welfare and recognition of the right to work.
The original Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill was, "A
bill to establish a national policy and nationwide machinery for
guaranteeing to all adult Americans able and willing to work the
availability of equal opportunities for useful and rewarding
employment." 9 Section 2(a) of the bill provided that "Congress hereby
declares that all adult Americans able and willing to work have the
right to equal opportunities for useful paid employment at fair rates
of compensation." This is the closest that proposed legislation has come
to recognizing and implementing the right to work. Section 8(b) of
the bill would have given the President five years to provide for full
implementation of the Act.
The Act, however, encountered fierce opposition. The first revi-
sions set five year targets of four percent unemployment overall, three
percent for those aged 20 years and older, as well as specifying the
government as employer of last resort. The president, however, was
given the right to revise the numerical goals. When finally passed
in 19781 the provision for the government's being the employer of
last resort had been stricken. The goal of reducing unemployment to
four percent by 1983 was maintained. Implementing provisions had
been largely dropped. As passed, the Act was called the Full Employ-
ment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. Once again, failure to
recognize the right to work resulted in legislation that made full
employment a national goal to be balanced with other economic goals.
The effectiveness of the Act can be gauged by the fact that in
1983 in the United States unemployment had not been reduced to
four percent but it had increased to 10.8 percent.2' Nonetheless the
Act states that, "The Congress further declares and establishes as
a national goal the fulfillment of the right to full opportunities for
useful paid employment at fair rates of compensation for all individuals
19. A bill, the Balanced Growth and Economic Planning Act of 1975, is the
genesis of a number of key provisions of H.R. 50 and S. 50, which were passed in
1978. See infra note 20.
20. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-523,
92 Stat. 1886.
21. ECONoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 199 (1983).
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able, willing, and seeking to work."' This kind of recognition by Con-
gress makes it possible to enlarge the discussion and eventually to
implement the right to work. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac
reports that "the bill retained a strong emotional impact with black
and labor groups, who lobbied intensely for it as a symbol of concern
for the jobless."'
The 1983 Economic Report of the President fulfilled the Presi-
dent's reporting requirement as specified in the 1978 Full Employ-
ment and Balanced Growth Act. Its tone was almost one of pleasure
as it reported negatively on a number of government policies. It noted
that "[b]ehavioral effects of social insurance programs such as
unemployment insurance include the encouragement of firms to lay
off workers and the inducement of persons to prolong their spells of
unemployment."' 4 It claimed that "[a]vailable evidence suggests,
however, that public works programs adopted in past recessions have
been counter-productive."' Further, "[a] recent study by the Office
of Management and Budget found that 90 percent of the outlays for
local public works projects designed to stimulate recovery from the
1974-75 recession occurred more than two and one-half years after
the trough of the recession."' Moreover, ". . many public works
projects do not yield a net increase in employment. . ."'; and "most
jobs in countercyclical public works projects are of extremely short
duration.. ." and "... very few jobs are actually filled by unemployed
workers."' Finally, "it would be imprudent to use macroeconomic
policies to reduce the unemployment rate below its inflation threshold
level of six to seven percent."'
Despite this negative appraisal of public programs and the fact
that the Report contained no mention of the right to employment, the
President did cite the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982
as the "major Federal initiative to reduce structural unemployment
among youth and adults"' . The partnership between private industry
and the public sector is a step in the right direction. The Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit program, which provides tax credits to certain
22. See supra note 20. at S 2(b).
23. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 275 (1978).
24. Economic Report of the President 38 (1983).
25. Id. at 39.
26. Id. at 40.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 41.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 44.
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employers who hire youths, and Title II of the JTPA, which provides
State training, job search, relocation assistance, and employment
counseling are other steps in the right direction. Nonetheless, the
United States is still far behind other free enterprise countries such
as Canada and some of the countries of Western Europe in its
approaches to implementing the goal of full employment."
Bruce Bartlett, deputy director of the Joint Economic Commit-
tee of Congress, in a Wall Street Journal article claims that:
According to OMB, the typical public works project expends
only 22 percent of its cost on direct employment. The other
78 percent of expenditures have only indirect employment
effects no different from a general increase in government
expenditures. In addition, OMB found that very few workers
employed in the public works projects were unemployed
prior to being hired- as few as 12 percent in one program
studied and no more than 27 percent in another. And
because 50 percent to 75 percent of jobs on public works
projects are skilled, the chances of such a project helping
unskilled, hard-core unemployed are almost nil."
The arguments of Bartlett and the fear of government, however,
do not get at the heart of the matter. Bartlett's arguments are
targeted against Congress's enacting ad hoc legislation to handle
cyclical unemployment, at the very time when that unemployment
seems to be coming to an end. His arguments do not address the
possibility of the government's acting not in an ad hoc way but setting
a policy that is constantly in operation and hence is not always
introduced too late to be effective. Bartlett also attacks a specific pro-
gram that involves public works and that does not include training
or retraining. That the United States government has not done a good
job with respect to controlling unemployment and that it has reacted
ineffectively when faced with high unemployment indicate not that
the government cannot implement the human right to work, but that
it has not even tried. Instead it has reacted to crises, as Bartlett
indicates, only after the crises have developed to such an extent that
they are on their way to a resolution.
The reaction of the American Government to the high rate of
31. See Batt, Canada's Good Example With Displaced Workers, 83 HARV. BUS.
Rsv. 6-22 (1983).
32. See Bartlett, Public Works Programs, supra note 10.
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unemployment in 1981-83 was to attempt to stimulate business by con-
trolling interest rates and reducing inflation. This approach assumed
that the employment of workers was a function and factor of business,
and not a direct responsibility of government. The reaction of the
Government would have and should have been different, however, if
it recognized a positive right to work as a human right.
Against whom is this right and how might it be implemented?
The right to work in its negative sense is a right to be exercised
against anyone who would prevent one from engaging in legitimate
labour, and like other human rights, would be enforced by the govern-
ment. It is also a right against the government not to be prevented
by it from working. Against whom the positive right to work is to
be exercised is less clear. Although private businesses may be
prevented from discriminating in their employment practices, and
although they may also be precluded from dismissing employees
arbitrarily and without cause, they are presently required neither to
hire any particular person or persons nor to keep their work force
at a certain number if their needs change, their financial situation
deteriorates, or their desire to cut costs or increase profits mandates
closing a plant, laying off workers, or trimming the number of
employees.
The right to work is presently exercised against a particular
employer by an employee only after the employee has secured employ-
ment, and only to the extent that the worker is productive and abides
by the employment agreement, and that the fortunes of the employer
make it possible to provide employment. The right here amounts to
protection from arbitrary dismissal and from discriminatory treatment.
It does not provide a guaranteed job unless that is part of the con-
tract. Whether we are moving to guaranteed job protection is another
issue; but it is not one that I shall argue for on the basis of the right
to work.
If the right to work does not mean that a potential worker has
any claim on any particular job, nor that he or she has any perma-
nent claim on a position once secured, what does the right mean? And
if it is not a right against particular employers, is it a right against
employers in general? The answer to the latter question is yes. In
practice, the unemployed raise their claims against the government.
Yet just as business benefits from the system adopted by society,
it is appropriate for business to share in meeting the obligations of
society to all its members as a result of the system. For this reason
business appropriately shares in society's obligation to implement each
person's right to work.
1984]
De George: The Right to Work:  Law and Ideology
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
34 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.19
If the number of jobs exceeded the number of workers, and if
workers were completely mobile, then, barring discrimination everyone
should be able to get a job. Even this ideal situation, however, does
not guarantee that everyone will get the kind of work that he or she
would like or is qualified for, and the right to work should guarantee
at least work commensurate to some minimal extent with one's
capabilities and training. Implementation should aim at the fulfillment
of the right in this way.
The burden of implementing the positive human right to work
might be placed on individual employers as well as on the govern-
ment, but would in either case have to be enforced by the govern-
ment. There are two aspects to the question of unemployment. One
deals with those who do not have employment and who seek it. The
other concerns those who have employment and who through no fault
of their own lose their jobs. Concentrating on the private employer,
government can take several approaches with respect to employment,
short of entering into the business decisions of hiring and firing. One
way is through tax incentives to motivate firms to retain employees
they might otherwise fire. A second is to require firms to relocate
employees when plants are shut down, or to retrain them for work
that is available. In Canada, unions and management cooperate in help-
ing relocate workers before a plant is closed. Another approach con-
sists of tax benefits for firms that provide training programs for the
unemployed, whether or not they are actually later employed by that
firm. A fourth approach would require a general temporary cut in
pay for all members of a firm together with a temporary reduction
in hours worked rather than the temporary furloughing of some
employees. This would mean that instead of laying off ten percent
of its workers, a firm would be required to reduce the pay and work
of everyone in the firm by ten percent. Lowering the number of hours
in the work week would also share work more widely making more
jobs available, as would precluding overtime for employees.
Placing these and other similar requirements on business may
seem like interference with their freedom. And of course it is. But
the freedom of business is and has always been legitimately cir-
cumscribed by the rights of the individuals in society. Such
interferences seem perhaps severe only because we have not con-
sidered seriously the human right to work.
The obligations of the government, however, do not end simply
with enforcing various measures against private enterprises. In times
of recession or depression, there will undoubtedly be many unemployed
people who cannot be employed by the private sector. The govern-
ment can meet its obligation to such people in a variety of ways. The
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most obvious but perhaps in the long run one of the least desirable
is for the government to become an employer of last resort, in any
of the senses discussed earlier. Such an approach is preferable to the
alternative of welfare. But it is by no means the only one. Structural
unemployment can be handled by a combination of relocation and
retraining, either provided directly by the government or subsidized
by the government. Some of those opposed to the right to work argue
that there are always jobs available, as a perusal of most newspapers
will attest. A close look at those ads shows that the jobs typically
require specialized training or experience, and are available at specific
locations. Training and relocation allowances are necessary to match
the unemployed with the employment available. Frictional unemploy-
ment can be eased by providing better information on the availability
of jobs. Securing of employment is one part of the right to work in
which the government can play a significant role. The securing of work
commensurate with one's capacities and training or education is, of
course, more difficult. But even employment that falls below one's
training is preferable to welfare, providing the work is not degrading
or simply make-work, and providing the real possibility for transfer
to more appropriate work is constantly considered according to some
fair system.
The third aspect of the right, securing fair remuneration requisite
to support oneself and one's family in dignity, can be implemented
in a variety of ways. The often proposed negative income tax is one
that is compatible with the right to work and the notion of the dignity
of work. A negative income tax is not charity but the readjustment
made by society to make up in part for the deficiency of the system
to otherwise implement the right to work. Those who argue that the
United States cannot afford to implement the right to work fail to
consider that the real cost of unemployment includes not only welfare
and other payments but also loss of productivity, that full employ-
ment means increased total wealth and productivity, and that many
nations- non-socialist as well as socialist-with economies less
developed than ours already recognize the right to work.
That the right to work is not recognized in the United States
is not only an anomaly; it is a moral failure that can and should be
rectified. If the right to work were considered seriously, American
society and the American government would take a different approach
to problems of unemployment and welfare. The legislated mechanisms
by which the right to work could be implemented would then be
approached more imaginatively and more seriously than at present.
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